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Big Data Proxies and Health 
Privacy Exceptionalism* 
Nicolas P. Terry† 
[B]ig data . . . is taking advantage of us without our permission. 
Often without consent or warning, and sometimes in completely 
surprising ways, big data analysts are tracking our every click and 
purchase, examining them to determine exactly who we are – estab-
lishing our name, good or otherwise – and retaining the information 
in dossiers that we know nothing about, much less consent to.1 
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Introduction 
Health data protection in this country has exhibited two key 
characteristics: a dependence on downstream data protection models 
and a history of health privacy exceptionalism. Regarding the former, 
while upstream data protection models limit data collection, down-
stream models primarily limit data distribution after collection. 
Regarding the latter, health care privacy exhibits classic 
exceptionalism properties. Traditionally and for good reason health 
care is subject to an enhanced sector-based approach to privacy 
regulation.2 
The article argues that, while “small data” rules displaying these 
two characteristics protect conventional health care data (doing so 
exceptionally, if not exceptionally well), big data facilitates the 
creation of health data proxies that are relatively unprotected. As a 
result, the carefully constructed, appropriate and necessary model of 
health data privacy will be eroded. Proxy data created outside the 
traditional space protected by extant health privacy models threatens 
to deprecate exceptionalism, reducing data protection to the very low 
levels applied to most other types of data. The rise of data proxies 
leads also to the questioning of our established downstream data 
protection model as the favored regulatory model. 
This article proceeds as follows: In Part I the traditional health 
privacy regimes (such as HIPAA)3 that protect “small” data are 
 
2. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of 
Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012) [hereinafter Terry, Protecting 
Patient Privacy]. 
3. “HIPAA” as used herein refers to the HIPAA Privacy and Security rules 
promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996. 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2013). The Privacy Rule was published in 
December 2000 but modified in August 2002. Compare Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) with Standards for Privacy of Individually 
Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53, 182 (Aug. 14, 
2002). Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act), the Secretary was given 
additional rule-making powers. See generally Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 226 (2009). Many of the modifications to HIPAA privacy and 
security rules were contained in the so-called Omnibus Rule. See 
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
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explained, as is the growing robustness of downstream data protection 
models in traditional health care space, including federal breach 
notification. Part II examines big data and its relationship with health 
care, including the data pools in play, and pays particular attention 
to three sources of data used to populate health proxies: “laundered” 
HIPAA data, patient-curated data, and medically-inflected data. Part 
III reexamines health privacy exceptionalism across legislative and 
regulatory domains seeking to understand its level of “stickiness” 
when faced with big data. Part IV examines how health privacy 
exceptionalism maps to the currently accepted rationales for health 
privacy and discusses the relative strengths of upstream and down-
stream data models in curbing what is viewed as big data’s serious 
assault on health privacy.  
I. Health Privacy and “Small” Data 
The HIPAA-HITECH data protection model dominates U.S. 
health privacy regulation. Since its unveiling in 1999, HIPAA’s 
idiosyncratic regulatory model has established itself as one of the most 
disliked (by health care providers) and critiqued (even by privacy 
advocates) pieces of regulation in the history of health care.  
Over the years HIPAA has faced criticism for the narrowness of 
its reach (e.g., health insurers but not life insurers, health care 
providers but not employers, awkwardly captured business associates, 
etc.), the expansive nature of its exceptions and authorizations, and 
poor enforcement.4 In light of its flaws, as HIPAA enters its teenage 
years it is appropriate to reflect on its considerable maturation. 
A. Understanding the HIPAA Model 
Unlike the regulations that operationalize it, the HIPAA model of 
health care privacy protection is relatively uncomplicated, if concep-
tually flawed. Federal interest in protected health information5 
originated as part of HIPAA’s “Administrative Simplification” model 
that was designed to maximize the electronic exchange flow of health 
care information involved in financial and administrative transactions. 
6 Almost two decades later the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has 
 
Breach Notification Rules and Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 
78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
4. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1 (2009); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, 
Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683-84 (2007). 
5. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012). 
6. 45 C.F.R. pt. 162 (2012). See generally HIPAA Administrative 
Simplification Statute and Rules, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
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further addressed this aspiration.7 Additionally, the HIPAA data 
protection model is based on the highly instrumental view that 
patient health (and frequently other, more public health goals) are 
maximized by collecting and storing all patient information and 
allowing it to flow freely within a health care entity. 
So understood, the HIPAA model displays some logically con-
sistent tenets. First, the HIPAA Privacy Rule employs a downstream 
data protection model (“confidentiality”) that seeks to contain the 
collected data within the health care system by prohibiting its 
migration to non-health care parties.8 Second, because the data 
protection model is a downstream one, it does not in any way impede 
the collection of patient data (as would a true upstream, collection-
focused “privacy” model). 
Third, the HIPAA Security Rule, another downstream model, 
imposes physical and technological constraints on patient data storage 
designed to make it difficult for those outside of the health care 
system to acquire such data without consent. Indeed, recently, and 
further discussed below,9 HITECH has introduced a further down-
stream model, breach notification, which requires those inside the 
health care system to disclose data breaches that expose patient 
information to outsiders. Finally, the HIPAA architects took the view 
that health care entities were not alone in requiring relatively unfet-
tered access to patient data. Health care entities that outsource tasks 
(such as legal or IT services) would need to give their contractors 
(known as “Business Associates”) access, and some public entities 
(such as the legal system and public health authorities) frequently 
required some level of access.  
These HIPAA fundamentals help explain, if not justify, some of 
the flaws of its data protection model. First, comprehensive infor-
mation about a patient seems to flow too easily within a health care 
entity. That flow is only minimally constrained by the “minimum 
necessary” standard applicable to “payment” and “healthcare opera-
tions”10 but not at all when used for treatment purposes when, say, 
restricting access to the treatment team might have been a better 
option.11  
 
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/index.ht 
ml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 1104, 124 Stat. 146 (2010). 
8. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2012). 
9. See infra Part I.C. 
10. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d) (2013). 
11. See, e.g., Terry & Francis, supra note 4, at 731-33. 
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Second, although we can assume (perhaps generously) that the 
health care entity originally collected the patient data solely for 
treatment and billing purposes (sometimes called primary use), 
HIPAA contains few meaningful constraints on subsequent (or 
secondary) uses of this data. The litany of such potential uses 
includes health quality measurement, reporting, improvement, patient 
safety research, clinical research, commercial uses including marketing 
and even the sale of patient data. Stakeholders tend to disagree on 
where to draw the line as to the appropriate use of patient data, and 
HIPAA, at least prior to HITECH, included little guidance.12 
Third, and of considerable importance to the arguments advanced 
in this article, HIPAA does not literally protect data. That is, the 
data subject’s privacy rights do not attach to and flow with the data. 
HIPAA, like the common law rules that preceded it,13 created a 
liability rather than a property model.14 Unlike those common law 
rules (such as the breach of confidence), HIPAA provides that the 
liability rule’s remedy inures to the benefit of the regulator rather 
than the data-subject. The font of this liability model, imposing a 
duty of confidentiality on the covered entity-patient relationship,15 is 
broader than the now obsolete bilateral physician-patient relationship, 
yet still attaches (and limits) data protection to traditional health 
care relationships and environments. In a statement predating the 
HIPAA statute the Institute of Medicine argued for the contrary, 
“[L]egislation should clearly establish that the confidentiality of 
person-identifiable data is an attribute afforded to the data elements 
themselves, regardless of who holds the data.”16 The fact that federal 
legislators and regulators ignored this exhortation has led to a 
situation whereby data-brokers can collect, process, and distribute 
health data outside of regulated space. 
 
12. See generally NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, 
ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR USES OF HEALTH DATA: A STEWARDSHIP 
FRAMEWORK FOR “SECONDARY USES” OF ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED 
AND TRANSMITTED HEALTH DATA (2007), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/071221lt.pdf. 
13. See generally Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An 
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1428 (1982). 
14. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
15. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2012). 
16. INST. OF MED., HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, 
DISCLOSURE, AND PRIVACY 191 (Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. 
Lohr, eds., 1994). 
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B. The Maturation of HIPAA 
As should already be obvious it is relatively easy to pick holes in 
the HIPAA privacy model. The litany of its flaws has always been 
sizeable. And although passing years have never seen any serious 
attempt to address its fundamental flaws (e.g., its narrow applicabil-
ity to traditional health care “covered entities”), persistent regulatory 
tinkering has brought about a far more robust confidentiality and 
security model. 
In 2009 the still youthful HIPAA clearly benefited mightily from 
the HITECH Act,17 although it must be acknowledged that the 
change in administrations with which the Act coincided likely was as 
important as the substantive tweaking to the regulatory model. While 
HITECH failed to address one cluster of HIPAA criticisms (the 
uncontrolled flow of patient information within health care entities), 
it did tackle some of the secondary uses by tightening up the consent 
processes for the use of patient data for marketing and the sale of 
patient data.18 And although HITECH also failed to address the 
leakage of HIPAA-protected data through entities such as public 
health departments,19it reconfigured the legal relationship of Business 
Associates (BA). Although BA agreements are still required, BAs 
themselves are now directly subject to the Privacy Rule and, more 
importantly, to its enforcement and penalties.20 
Most noticeable, however, has been the fundamental shift in en-
forcement. HIPAA privacy and security introduced a potentially 
robust process model of compliance, enforcement, and penalties. 
HITECH modified the penalty framework,21 and the Obama Admin-
istration responded by coordinating all enforcement under the Office 
of Civil Rights (OCR)22 and appointing a career prosecutor to head its 
efforts.23 Soon thereafter OCR was investigating major privacy and 
 
17. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act, enacted as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, was signed into law on February 17, 2009. 
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 227 (2009) (codified at 
scattered parts of 42 U.S.C.). 
18. See HITECH Act § 13405. 
19. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
20. See HITECH Act §§ 13401, 13408. 
21. HITECH Act § 13410. 
22. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
23. See Office for Civil Rights Director Leon Rodriguez, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/biographydirectorrodriguez.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
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security breach cases and levying “statement” penalties.24 HITECH’s 
breach notification model, discussed below, seems to have had an 
impact here as data custodians and their BAs have to report when 
patient data has been compromised. 
While increasingly incremental in nature, further tweaks to 
HIPAA’s “small data” regulatory model are likely. The “minimum 
necessary” standard may be revisited and data segmentation models 
may slow the movement of entire patient files within institutions.25 
But overall, while still overly cumbersome and lacking clear, general-
ized principles, today’s HIPAA has emerged as a relatively strong 
downstream protection model with active and effective enforcement. 
C. The Omnibus Rule and Breach Notification 
Because HIPAA health privacy exceptionalism has been tied to 
downstream protection models, it was not surprising that the in-
creased privacy protection (and exceptionalism) introduced by 
HITECH saw a doubling down on downstream protection with breach 
notification, a rule now fleshed out by the 2013 omnibus privacy 
rule.26 
With a legislative requirement to notify a data subject of a data 
breach, the data custodian’s duty is triggered upon loss of control of 
the data, making a breach notification rule the definitive downstream 
protective model. Breach notification laws proliferated because of the 
dramatic increase in identity theft.27 Although all federal agencies are 
 
24. See Health Information Privacy Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/index.h
tml (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
25. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Access to Sensitive Information in 
Segmented Electronic Health Records, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 394, 396 
(2012). 
26. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 
Fed. Reg. 5556, 5556 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 
164). 
27. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-363, IDENTITY 
THEFT, PREVALENCE AND COST APPEAR TO BE GROWING (2002), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/233900.pdf; LYNN 
LANGSTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY THEFT REPORTED BY 
HOUSEHOLDS, 2005-2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh0510.pdf; see also Neil Versel, 
Cyber Crooks Target Healthcare For Financial Data, INFO. WEEK, (Oct. 
24, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-
privacy/cyber-crooks-target-healthcare-for-finan/240009668. See 
generally Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture 
of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
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subject to a robust breach notification policy,28 federal legislation to 
cover private parties has been proposed but not yet passed.29 In 
contrast, and in the decade following California’s 2002 example,30 
forty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted breach 
notification laws.31 
More recently attention has turned to medical identity theft.32 It 
has been argued that medical identities are highly valued by criminals 
because of the comprehensive data that are contained in, for example, 
a stolen electronic medical record (EMR).33 A 2006 report from The 
World Privacy Forum focused attention on the issue,34 and in 2009 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Tech-
nology (ONC) commissioned a study on the subject from Booz Allen 
Hamilton.35 Today both the Department of Health and Human 
 
Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 89 (2001). 
28. See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office 
of Mgmt. and Budget, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 
22, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007
/m07-16.pdf. 
29. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY 
BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42475.pdf (detailing the failed 
federal bills). 
30. S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (amending Cal. Civ. Code 
§§ 1798.29, 1798.82, and 1798.84 and itself amended by S.B. 24, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011)). 
31. See STEVENS, supra note 29, at 4. 
32. See generally Katherine M. Sullivan, But Doctor, I Still Have Both Feet! 
Remedial Problems Faced by Victims of Medical Identity Theft, 35 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 647 (2009). 
33. See generally HEALTH RESEARCH INST., OLD DATA LEARNS NEW TRICKS: 
MANAGING PATIENT SECURITY AND PRIVACY ON A NEW DATA-SHARING 
PLAYGROUND (2011), available at http://pwchealth.com/cgi-
local/hregister.cgi/reg/old-data-learns-new-tricks.pdf. 
34. WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: THE INFORMATION 
CRIME THAT CAN KILL YOU (2006), available at 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2007/11/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf. 
35. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE NAT’L 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 
FINAL REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/medidtheftreport011509_0.p
df. 
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Services (HHS)’s Office of Inspector General36 and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)37 web sites have information pages concerning 
medical identity theft. According to a 2012 Ponemon Institute study, 
52% of health care organizations experienced one or more incidents of 
medical identity theft.38 The 2013 Survey on Medical Identity Theft 
(also conducted by the Ponemon Institute) estimated a 19% increase 
in medical identity theft victims year-to-year.39 
Relatively few states include health data within their definition of 
the personal information subject to breach notification.40 Others, true 
to the U.S. sector-based approach to privacy regulation, exclude data 
covered by, say, HIPAA or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(GLBA).41 
HITECH introduced two closely related breach notification re-
gimes. The first, introduced by Section 13402, requires HIPAA 
covered entities42 and HIPAA BAs43 to provide notification following a 
breach of “unsecured protected health information.”44 The second, 
courtesy of Section 13407, imposes a similar duty on vendors of 
personal health records (PHR)45 and their third party service provid-
ers46 with regard to “Unsecured PHR Identifiable Health 
Information.”47 Rulemaking authority and enforcement are vested in 
the HHS regarding the former and the FTC regarding the latter.48  
 
36. Medical ID Theft/Fraud Information, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/medical-id-
theft/index.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
37. Id. 
38. PONEMON INST., THIRD ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT 
PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY 13 (2012), available at 
http://www2.idexpertscorp.com/assets/uploads/ponemon2012/Third_A
nnual_Study_on_Patient_Privacy_FINAL.pdf. 
39. PONEMON INST., 2013 SURVEY ON MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 5 (2013).  
40. See STEVENS, supra note 29, at 6. 
41. Id. 
42. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 260 (2009). 
43. § 13402(b). 
44. § 13402(h)(1)(A) (“[P]rotected health information that is not secured 
through the use of a technology or methodology specified by the 
Secretary.”). 
45. § 13407(a). 
46. § 13407(b). 
47. § 13407(f)(3). 
48. § 13407(g)(1). See generally, Health Privacy, FTC, 
http://business.ftc.gov/privacy-and-security/health-privacy (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2014). 
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The regulation of PHRs is a limited (but ultimately unsuccessful) 
attempt to expand health data protection from a narrow sector-
provider based model (e.g., information held by a covered entity) to a 
data-type based model. Unfortunately it stopped short of a broad 
data-type model (e.g., by protecting the data itself held by any data 
custodian), limiting the custodian cohort to PHR providers.49 
It is an interesting question why HITECH added a breach notifi-
cation data protection model. Certainly medical identity theft was 
being raised as an issue.50 As likely this rethinking of the approach to 
data protection may have been triggered by the expansion of personal 
health records services offered by non-health companies such as 
Google.51 Maybe the HITECH architects could not agree on a way to 
open up the broader and established HIPAA model to apply to non-
traditional custodians of health data (BAs aside) and so had to settle 
on a new but limited data protection model as the legislative alterna-
tive. Notwithstanding, the result was that HITECH authorized 
regulatory activity by the FTC that would mirror the work of HHS in 
the more narrowly defined, traditional health space. Ironically, 
however, by the time HITECH was passed the PHR business was 
slowing and Google Health, the PHR poster-child, soon would be 
closed.52  
Following their HITECH mandate both HHS and FTC issued 
broadly similar interim breach notification regulations.53 For example, 
the rules provided for safe harbors identifying technological standards 
(such as encryption levels) that negated the notification duty even if 
the data was acquired by a third party. The HHS rule provided that a 
notifiable “breach” occurred when the security or privacy of the 
protected health information was compromised because it posed “a 
significant risk of financial, reputational or other harm to the individ-
ual.”54 Such a breach triggered a responsibility to notify affected  
49. See infra note 98.  
50. See WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, supra note 34; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 35. 
51. See generally Steve Lohr, Dr. Google and Dr. Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 13, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/14/technology/14iht14healthnet.7107
507.html?pagewanted=all. 
52. For further reflections on the demise of Google Health, see Nicolas 
Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 
NEVADA L.J. 722, 745-49 (2013). 
53. Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 
Fed. Reg. 42,740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 
164); Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 
74 Fed. Reg. 42,962 (August 24, 2009) (to be codified 16 C.F.R. pt. 
318). 
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2009). 
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individuals,55 the media,56 and the Secretary.57 In cases of breaches 
involving 500 or more individuals, immediate notification to the 
Secretary is required58 in order to enable posting on the “Wall of 
Shame” as provided for by HITECH.59 
In 2013 HHS published the so-called Omnibus Rule, a final rule in 
large part rolling up several previously published interim rules that 
had been authorized by HITECH.60 The Omnibus Rule’s definition of 
breach is substantially different from that in the interim rule. First, 
“an [unpermitted] acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected 
health information” now is presumed to be a breach.61 Second, the 
covered entity carries the burden of refuting that presumption with a 
risk assessment that considers:  
 
(i) the nature and extent of the protected health information 
involved, including the types of identifiers and the likelihood of 
re-identification; 
(ii) the unauthorized person who used the protected health in-
formation or to whom the disclosure was made; 
(iii) whether the protected health information was actually ac-
quired or viewed; and 
(iv) the extent to which the risk to the protected health infor-
mation has been mitigated.62 
 
In contrast, the FTC rule applicable to non-HIPAA PHR vendors 
relies on the somewhat “older” approach to breach whereby 
“[u]nauthorized acquisition will be presumed to include unauthorized 
access to unsecured PHR identifiable health information” absent 
“reliable evidence showing that there has not been, or could not 
reasonably have been, unauthorized acquisition of such information.”63 
Not only do somewhat different rules apply to breach notification 
regarding essentially similar EMR or PHR data, but security breaches 
 
55. § 164.404. 
56. § 164.406. 
57. § 164.408(a). 
58. § 164.408(b). 
59. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(e)(4), 123 Stat. 262 
(2009). 
60. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules and Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 
78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 
164). 
61. 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2013). 
62. Id. 
63. Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 318 (2009). 
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regarding health data in the hands of custodians who are neither 
HIPAA entities nor PHR vendors generally do not require breach 
notification. Specifically, this regulatory gap works in favor of big 
data custodians of non-HIPAA (medically inflected) health data or 
“laundered” HIPAA data. A sufficiently serious breach in the face of 
poor security practices or technology might trigger an FTC inquiry.64 
Such eventuality aside, the only possible regulatory model would be 
state law breach notification. As already noted, few state laws include 
health information within their definitions of protected data,65 though 
there are exceptions such as the California law.66 
Breach notification as a data protection model is deserving of 
some criticism. It is only triggered when, necessarily, data protection 
has failed,67 and it is a somewhat immature data protection model 
that likely will need additional calibration as we analyze its under-
regulation or over-regulation tendencies. For example, to the extent 
that more experience tells us that we may be over-regulating some 
types of minor breaches it might be sensible to allow for an apology-
plus-purchase of insurance defense or safe harbor.  
Notwithstanding, HITECH’s version seems to have some value. 
First, as clearly intended by the statute,68 the “Wall of Shame” 
website acts as a strong deterrence system.69 As more data is collected 
about the porousness of our health care providers’ systems, a simple 
web listing could evolve into a more robust and useful ranking model 
across privacy and security dimensions, as (for example) with the 
quality/safety-based Hospital Compare.70 Second, the notification 
system has become an important part of OCR enforcement as the 
agency relies on breach notifications to initiate privacy and security 
rule enforcement.71 
 
64. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
65. See STEVENS, supra note 29, at 6. 
66. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1798.29(g)(4), (5) (2012). See also CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 1280.15(b) (2012). 
67. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More 
Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 216, 245 (2009). 
68. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(e)(4), 123 Stat. 262 
(2009). 
69. See Health Information Privacy Breaches Affecting 500 or More 
Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificatio
nrule/breachtool.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
70. See generally Hospital Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, 
http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).  
71. For example, a May 2013 settlement with Idaho State University for 
Security Rule violations followed receipt of a notification of breach to 
HHS. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. v. Idaho St. Univ. (May 10, 
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On balance, breach notification has strengthened its fellow down-
stream protection models – HIPAA confidentiality and security. First, 
the HITECH Act’s breach notification model includes a public 
“shaming” deterrent designed to improve compliance with the HIPAA 
rules.72 Second, and obviously, notifying HHS of a substantial breach 
invites investigation by OCR. 
Overall (and likely this was an unintended consequence) breach 
notification is an endorsement of health privacy exceptionalism with 
its regulatory model applying to very narrow slices of health data 
custodians (HIPAA, PHR and “others”). However, the narrowness of 
its definition and its quintessential downstream data protection model 
confirm its irrelevance in any search for a federal privacy response to 
big data’s growing hold on medically inflected data. 
II. The Data Proxies’ Challenge to Health Privacy  
Big data is so named because of its unprecedented volume and for 
its “complexity, diversity, and timeliness.” 73 Big data refers not only 
to the collection and storage of extremely large data sets but also the 
data mining and predictive analytic routines that process the data, 
the latter being understood as “[t]echnology that learns from experi-
ence (data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to 
drive better decisions.”74 
Essentially big data is the latest type of business intelligence (BI), 
or, to frame it slightly differently, the latest BI analytics are what 
 
2013) (resolution agreement), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/isu-
agreement.pdf. Similarly, a July 2013 resolution agreement with the 
managed care provider WellPoint, Inc., called for a payment of $1.7m 
after the exposure of 612,402 records. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. 
Servs. v. WellPoint, Inc. (July 8, 2013) (resolution agreement), available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/well 
point-agreement.pdf. 
72. HITECH Act § 13402(e)(4) (“The Secretary shall make available to the 
public on the Internet website of the Department of Health and Human 
Services a list that identifies each covered entity involved in a breach … 
in which the unsecured protected health information of more than 500 
individuals is acquired or disclosed.”). 
73. PETER GROVES ET AL., CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, BUS. TECH. 
OFFICE, THE “BIG DATA” REVOLUTION IN HEALTHCARE: ACCELERATING 
VALUE AND INNOVATION 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/~/m
edia/mckinsey/dotcom/insights/health%20care/the%20big-
data%20revolution%20in%20us%20health%20care/the_big_data_revolu
tion_in_healthcare.ashx. 
74. ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO 
WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 11 (2013). 
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extract value from big data.75 Not surprisingly, MBA-speak business 
jargon dominates the space. Thus, according to Gartner, Inc., “‘Big 
data’ is high-volume, –velocity and –variety information assets that 
demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for 
enhanced insight and decision making.”76 It is important not to 
underestimate one of these three properties: high-variety. Big data 
does not use structured databases (or at least is not as reliant on 
them as previous generation systems such as credit reporting) but is 
capable of absorbing high-variety data. Data sources (or data pools) 
continually change and expand; yet big data seems adept at digesting 
them. As described in a recent report by the Centre For Information 
Policy Leadership: 
While traditionally analytics has been used to find answers to 
predetermined questions, its application to big data enables ex-
ploration of information to see what knowledge may be derived 
from it, and to identify connections and relationships that are 
unexpected or were previously unknowable. When organisations 
employ analytics to explore data’s potential for one use, other 
possible uses that may not have been previously considered of-
ten are revealed. Big data’s potential to yield unanticipated 
insights, the dramatically low cost of information storage and 
the rapidly advancing power of algorithms have shifted organi-
sations’ priorities to collecting and harnessing as much data as 
possible and then attempting to make sense of it.77 
The analytics of big data seek to predict the behavior not only of 
populations or cohorts but also of individuals. In Predictive Analytics: 
 
75. See generally Doron Aspitz, It’s Time to Instill More BI Into Business 
Intelligence, WIRED (May 6, 2013), 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/05/its-time-to-instill-more-bi-into-
business-intelligence. See also Tom Pringle, Putting the Business Back 
into Business Intelligence, INFO. AGE (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.information-age.com/technology/information-
management/123457179/putting-the-business-back-into-business-
intelligence. 
76. Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three 
Parts, Not to Be Confused with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-
data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs. 
See also Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The 
Management Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2012, at 62. 
77. CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS: SEEKING 
FOUNDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PRIVACY GUIDANCE, A DISCUSSION 
DOCUMENT 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News_files/Big_Da
ta_and_Analytics_February_2013.pdf. 
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The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or Die, computer 
scientist Eric Siegel explained the distinction as follows: 
Forecasting makes aggregate predictions on a macroscopic level. 
How will the economy fare? Which presidential candidate will 
win more votes in Ohio? Whereas forecasting estimates the total 
number of ice cream cones to be purchased next month in Ne-
braska, predictive technology tells you which individual 
Nebraskans are most likely to be seen with cone in hand.78 
In the context of health information the business intelligence grail 
is to identify and exploit a patient’s differential health status. Accord-
ing to Neil Biehn, with such segmentation “organizations can more 
easily identify anomalous buying behavior and make intelligent 
product and offer recommendations that are statistically more likely 
to be purchased.”79 Biehn continues, “If two customers are alike but 
not buying the same products, the data analysis can advise which 
opportunities the sales team might be missing,” concluding that 
“[t]his is the type of Big Data viability that moves the needle in the 
real world.”80 
The privacy implications of individuated big data analysis are 
profound. Beyond the expropriation or “using” objections to such 
data collection and processing, such as Commissioner Brill’s critique 
quoted at the beginning of this article,81 the computer modeling of 
predictive analytics predicts a world of dehumanizing “data determin-
ism.” FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez described “data determinism” 
as the judgment of persons:  
. . . not because of what they’ve done, or what they will do in 
the future, but because inferences or correlations drawn by algo-
rithms suggest they may behave in ways that make them poor 
credit or insurance risks, unsuitable candidates for employment 
or admission to schools or other institutions, or unlikely to carry 
out certain functions.82  
 
78. SIEGEL, supra note 74, at 12. 
79. Neil Biehn, Realizing Big Data Benefits: The Intersection of Science 
and Customer Segmentation, WIRED (June 7, 2013, 11:32 AM), 
http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/realizing-big-data-benefits-the-
intersection-of-science-and. 
80. Id. 
81. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
82. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Keynote Address at the Tech. Pol’y 
Inst. Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View From 
the Lifeguard’s Chair 7 (Aug. 19, 2013), available at 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130819bigdataaspen.pdf. 
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Finally, there is the “Doomsday” scenario – a big data breach. The 
industrial scale data-warehousing model is the antithesis of the “silo” 
model of data storage used in the pre-information age. The lack of 
data liquidity (with all of its informational disadvantages) inherent in 
that model meant that there was little profit or harm in an isolated 
security breach. The opposite is true with big data storage. However, 
there are reports that big data brokers are not immune from the same 
security breaches that are plaguing other businesses.83 
A. “Laundered” HIPAA Data 
One key to appreciating this threat to health privacy is to under-
stand the health care data pools that big data seeks to leverage. In 
The “Big Data” Revolution in Healthcare, the McKinsey Global 
Institute identifies four primary data pools “at the heart of the big-
data revolution in healthcare”: activity (claims) and cost data, clinical 
data, pharmaceutical R&D data, and patient behavior and sentiment 
data.84 Previously I have argued that proprietary concerns will likely 
slow the sharing of drug and device data by manufacturers or claims 
and related financial data by health care providers while hurdles to 
interoperability will hinder the migration of clinical data from 
EMRs.85 More immediately big data is using three types of health-
specific data to construct proxies for HIPAA-protected data. These 
are “laundered” HIPAA data, patient-curated information, and 
medically inflected (e.g. patient behavior and sentiment) data. 
There has always been something lopsided about the HIPAA reg-
ulatory model. Rather than concentrating on securing health data, 
most of the Privacy Rule provisions detail wide-ranging exceptions 
(public health, judicial, and regulatory) to data protection or outline 
the process by which patients can consent to disclosure.86 Just 
recently, for example, a pharmacy chain made the headlines by 
conditioning its loyalty rewards program on a broad HIPAA authori-
zation.87 It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that there has been 
leakage of health data through the very system set up to protect it. 
Such leakage has been exacerbated by the mission creep exhibited by 
 
83. Brian Krebs, Data Broker Giants Hacked by ID Theft Service, 
KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/09/data-broker-giants-hacked-by-id-
theft-service/. 
84. GROVES ET AL., supra note 73, at 4. 
85. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy, supra note 2, at 392. 
86. Terry & Francis, supra note 4, at 714-15. 
87. David Lazarus, CVS Thinks $50 is Enough Reward for Giving Up 
Healthcare Privacy, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-
20130816,0,2932825.column. 
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the recipients of data under HIPAA, particularly public health 
agencies. As Wendy Mariner notes: 
Today, almost everyone, regardless of station, could be subject 
to public health surveillance. The scope of public health surveil-
lance has grown significantly beyond its contagious disease 
origins . . . . [A] new generation of reporting laws reflects a goal 
of many people in public health: to collect data about chronic 
diseases outside the context of a research study and without the 
need to obtain any individual patient’s informed consent. . . . 
Do they offer the promise of medical advances, or the threat of 
“general searches, which the authors of the Bill of Rights were 
so concerned to protect against?”88 
For example, a 2013 report from the Citizens’ Council for Health 
Freedom alleges broad state health surveillance based on individual 
and often identifiable records.89 However, public health authorities are 
not only voraciously consuming patient data but also abetting the 
acquisition of the same by big data companies. 
Researchers at Harvard’s Data Privacy Lab have found that thir-
ty-three states re-release patient hospital discharge data that they 
have acquired as HIPAA-permitted recipients of patient data.90 
Generally states release this data (that is no longer in the HIPAA-
protected zone) in somewhat de-identified or anonymized form but 
with little restriction on future use of the data. The naïve thought 
that such data was only being released to academic researchers was 
upended by the Data Privacy Lab’s discovery that many of the major 
buyers of such state health databases were big data companies.91 Most 
states only charge small fees that are not a major source of revenue 
for them, and many are oblivious to this practice.92 
 
88. Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and 
Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347, 350-51 (2007) (quoting TECH. & 
PRIV. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SAFEGUARDING 
PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 48-49 (2004), available at 
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf). 
89. Press Release, Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom, 50-State Report 
Unveiled; States Track Medical Data from Birth to Death without 
Consent (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cchfreedom.org/cchf.php/802#.UheQzRukr9I. 
90. SEAN HOOLEY & LATANYA SWEENEY, HARV. UNIV., DATA PRIV. LAB, 
SURVEY OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE STATE HEALTH DATABASES 3 (2013), 
available at http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/50states/1075-1.pdf. 
91. See, e.g., Top Buyers of Publicly Available State Health Databases, THE 
DATA MAP, http://thedatamap.org/buyers.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2014).  
92. Jordan Robertson, States’ Hospital Data for Sale Puts Privacy in 
Jeopardy, BUS. WK. (June 5, 2013), 
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The obvious solution is for the state public health agencies to 
contractually prohibit re-identification. For example, the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) collects information about physician 
malpractice awards, adverse licensure reports, and Medicare/Medicaid 
exclusions.93 Although it is not a public resource, the NPDB does 
release de-identified data. Following a re-identification episode94 
NPDB now contains a prohibition on re-identification, specifically 
against using its “dataset alone or in combination with other data to 
identify any individual or entity or otherwise link information from 
this file with information in another dataset in a manner that includes 
the identity of an individual or entity.”95 
Clearly, state health departments and any similarly placed recipi-
ents of HIPAA data should require similar restrictions. Indeed, the 
proposed FTC privacy framework would mandate such: 
. . . [I]f a company makes such de-identified data available to 
other companies – whether service providers or other third par-
ties – it should contractually prohibit such entities from 
attempting to re-identify the data. The company that transfers 
or otherwise makes the data available should exercise reasonable 
oversight to monitor compliance with these contractual provi-
sions and take appropriate steps to address contractual 
violations.96 
Until such prohibitions are instituted, HIPAA’s public health ex-
ception unpardonably will continue to facilitate the “laundering” of 
protected patient data as it is transferred from a data protected 
domain to unprotected space. 
B. The Self-Quantified, Self-Curating Patient 
Ironically one of the greatest threats to an individual’s health pri-
vacy is . . . the individual. One of the first examples of theretofore 
 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-05/states-hospital-data-
for-sale-leaves-veteran-s-privacy-at-risk. 
93. As originally mandated by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2013) (providing for payment of malpractice 
awards); § 11132 (providing for adverse license actions); § 11133 
(providing for Medicare/Medicaid exclusion). 
94. See Duff Wilson, Withdrawal of Database on Doctors Is Protested, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/health/16doctor.html?_r=0. 
95. Public Use Data File, NAT’L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 
http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/publicData.jsp (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2014). 
96. FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 21 (2012), 
available at http://www. ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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HIPAA-protected data migrating to HIPAA-free space was during 
President George W. Bush’s administration at a time when the 
slowing of the administration’s provider-curated EMR program 
coincided with the launching of PHR platforms by Google and 
Microsoft.97 As a result the HITECH Act architects attempted to 
protect for the first time health data that migrated from a protected 
to an unprotected (or marginally protected) zone. However, they 
chose to do so with a swiftly outmoded, downstream breach notifica-
tion model.98 
In the interim, different (and unregulated) technologies have 
emerged that encourage patient rather than provider curation of 
health data. The most obvious example is the federal government’s 
“Blue Button” technology99 that allows patients to download their 
records to their own devices. The “Blue Button” approach to patient 
access and hence control of their health data has become a rallying 
cry for many (if not all)100 patient privacy advocates101 and has been 
encouraged by President Obama’s administration.102 Indeed, then 
ONC National Coordinator Farzad Mostashari announced a Blue 
Button Mash-Up challenge to build software for patients designed to 
combine their downloaded Blue Button information with other data 
sources.103 
 
97. See generally Terry, supra note 67. 
98. See discussion supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
99. See Lygeia Ricciardi, The Blue Button Movement: Kicking off National 
Health IT Week with Consumer Engagement, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/bluebutton/ (last updated Mar. 11, 2014); 
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(2012). 
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ANGELO STANDARD TIMES (July 8, 2013), 
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PRIVACY RIGHTS (June 23, 2013), 
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Data, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECH. POL’Y BLOG (OCT. 7, 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/10/07/blue-button-
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At root such patient curation of health data bespeaks autonomy 
and is symbolic of patient ownership of the data. However, it fails to 
take into account one practical limitation –the canonical version of 
the record will remain in the provider’s control – and one legal 
limitation – that only the provider-curated copy is protected by 
HIPAA-HITECH. In contrast, the patient-curated “copy” attracts 
little meaningful privacy protection. Well-meaning privacy advocates 
should think carefully before promoting this autonomy-friendly 
“control” model until data protection laws (not to mention patient 
education as to good data practices) catch up with patient curated 
data. 
A similarly dichotomous result is likely as the medically quanti-
fied self develops. The quantified-self movement concentrates on 
personal collection and curation of inputs and performance.104 Obvi-
ously, health, wellness, and medically inflected data will likely 
comprise a large proportion of such data. 
A similar, if less formal, scenario is emerging around health and 
wellness apps on smartphones and connected domestic appliances such 
as scales and blood pressure cuffs.105 Smartphones are crammed with 
sensors for location, orientation, sound, and pictures that add richness 
to data collection.106 And there is ongoing and explosive growth in the 
medical apps space that seeks to leverage such sensors. 107 
More and more we are going to demand control of information 
about ourselves and generate medically inflected and core health data 
about ourselves. These processes will in most cases lead to medically 
inflected data that exists outside of the HIPAA-HITECH protected 
zone. 
C. Medically Inflected Data 
Arguably the greatest challenge to the current health privacy 
models of data protection, and hence to health privacy 
exceptionalism, is the proliferation of what McKinsey refers to as 
patient behavior and sentiment data.108 According to ProPublica, big 
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107. See generally Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution? (SMU 
Dedman Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper, No. 128, June 24, 2013), 
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data companies start with basic information about individuals before 
adding demographics, educational level, life events, credit reports, 
hobbies, salary information, purchase histories, and voting records.109 
As to health information: 
Data companies can capture information about your “interests” 
in certain health conditions based on what you buy – or what 
you search for online. Datalogix has lists of people classified as 
“allergy sufferers” and “dieters.” Acxiom sells data on whether 
an individual has an “online search propensity” for a certain 
“ailment or prescription.”110 
Unlike laundered HIPAA or patient self-curated data, these medi-
cally inflected data were not created for direct wellness or medical 
purposes. Rather, medically inflected data are quintessential high-
variety big data. Their sources are diverse and include web-browsing 
trails,111 exhaust data from online transactions,112 web scrapers,113 
social media interactions,114 mobile phone usage,115 smartphone 
sensors,116 mobile health apps,117 and both medical118 and non-medical 
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networked devices.119 Some of this data may still be unused by big 
data because it is “dark data” that has been left over or discarded 
from other processes and not yet leveraged,120 or, in the words of 
Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, “[T]here’s a huge amount of 
signal in the noise, simply waiting to be released.”121 
Consider just one example of a recognized big data source: social 
media interactions. Michal Kosinski and colleagues analyzed the 
Facebook “likes” of almost 60,000 volunteers. Using big data tech-
niques the researchers were able to predict “sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, 
happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, age, and 
gender” and speculated that “given appropriate training data, it may 
be possible to reveal other attributes as well.”122 As hypothesized by 
FTC Commissioner Julie Brill: 
[W]e can easily imagine a company that could develop algo-
rithms that will predict . . . health conditions – diabetes, cancer, 
mental illness – based on information about routine transactions 
 
http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/pdf/srep01376. 
pdf.  
117. See, e.g., Emily Steel & April Dembosky, Health App Users Have New 
Symptom to Fear, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/97161928-12dd-11e3-a05e-
00144feabdc0.html. 
118. See, e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus & Christopher Weaver, Heart Gadgets 
Test Privacy-Law Limits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203937004578078820874
744076.html. 
119. See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Requiem for Our Wonderfully Inefficient 
World, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/04/senor
_based_dynamic_pricing_may_be_efficient_but_it_could_create_in
equality.html. 
120. Isaac Sacolick, Dark Data – A Business Definition, SOCIAL, AGILE, AND 
TRANSFORMATION (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://blogs.starcio.com/2013/04/dark-data-business-definition.html 
(“Dark data is data and content that exists and is stored, but is not 
leveraged and analyzed for intelligence or used in forward looking 
decisions.”). 
121. McAfee & Brynjolfsson, supra note 76, at 63. 
122. Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable 
from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5805 (2013). See also Katie Lobosco, Facebook 
Friends Could Change Your Credit Score, CNN (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/26/technology/social/facebook-credit-
score/index.html?hpt=hp_t2 (describing how “some financial lending 
companies have found that social connections can be a good indicator of 
a person’s creditworthiness”).  
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– store purchases, web searches, and social media posts – and 
sells that information to marketers and others.123 
Hyper amounts of medically inflected data processed through ad-
vanced analytics provide data custodians with a proxy for protected 
health information without the HIPAA-HITECH regulatory costs, 
negating health privacy exceptionalism. HIPAA was designed, inter 
alia, to limit the secondary uses of health data, a game of Whac-A-
Mole played out in the regulated zone with different types of prohibi-
tions, authorizations and consents, compound authorization rules and 
opt-in or opt-out defaults. Big data marginalizes that game. It 
absorbs clinical and related data pools such as “laundered” HIPAA 
data and unregulated medically inflected data. As a result the new 
privacy reality is no longer the fifteen-year-old fight to contain 
secondary uses of protected data but a new problem—the primary use 
of secondary data. In the words of Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and 
Kenneth Cukier, “Unfortunately, the [privacy] problem has been 
transformed. With big data, the value of information no longer resides 
solely in its primary purpose . . . it is now in secondary uses.” 124 In 
short, big data can produce basically unprotected patient-level data 
that will serve as an effective proxy for HIPAA-protected data. 
III. How “Sticky” is Health Privacy Exceptionalism? 
Claims for exceptional treatment are frequently controversial. 
This is the case for such diverse claims as the “American 
Exceptionalism” lens on foreign relations,125 the constitutionality of 
health care legislation,126 HIV-AIDS policy,127 and so on. At the risk of 
being reductive, however, U.S. law encourages such exceptionalism by 
 
123. Brill, supra note 1, at 7. 
124. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 
153 (2013). 
125. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003).  
126. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of Health-
Care Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court’s Obamacare Decision, 142 
CHEST 559, 559-60 (2012), available at 
http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/data/Journals/CHEST/24838/5
59.pdf (highlighting the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize special 
constitutional treatment for healthcare legislation). 
127. See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini, What Lessons Can We Learn from the 
Exceptionalism Debate (Finally)?, 29 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 149 (2001); 
Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS Exceptionalism” and the Law, 27 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 251 (1994). 
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eschewing broad principles of privacy law of general application, in 
contrast to, say, European law.128 
Yet the claims for health privacy exceptionalism are well estab-
lished and have exceptional provenance. The Institute of Medicine, 
which “asks and answers the nation’s most pressing questions about 
health and health care,”129 argued prior to HIPAA: 
For the most part, privacy law in this country has been formu-
lated under the assumption that holders of information about 
people may generally do with it what they please, constrained 
only by corporate ethics and the good taste of business, societal 
acceptance (or outrage), occasional attention by the govern-
ment, pressures of consumer activist groups, and the 
consequences of legal actions brought by individuals or consum-
er groups. This historical view may prove inappropriate or even 
dangerous in regard to health data.130 
The Institute of Medicine has since repeated this position in 
2001’s Crossing the Chasm.131 Indeed, exceptionalism seems sufficient-
ly well established in the domain to support claims for heightened 
exceptional treatment for subsets of health information, such as 
psychiatric privacy,132 genetic privacy,133 and neuro-privacy.134 
 
128. See generally Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Beyond Privacy, Beyond 
Rights-Toward a “Systems” Theory of Information Governance, 98 CAL. 
L. REV. 1853 (2010) (arguing that the United States’ rights-based 
approach to information privacy has largely failed and that it would 
benefit from exploring a European style “information-governance 
system”). See also Nicolas P. Terry, Privacy and the Health Information 
Domain: Properties, Models and Unintended Results, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH 
L. 223, 228-229 (2003). 
129. About the IOM, INST. OF MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx 
(last updated Nov. 4, 2013). 
130. INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 211. 
131. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 172 (2001) (“The demands of health care with 
regard to security and availability are both more stringent and more 
varied than those of other industries.”). 
132. APA Generally Pleased With HIPAA Final Privacy Rule, PSYCHIATRIC 
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://alert.psychiatricnews.org/2013/01/apa-
generally-pleased-with-hipaa-final.html. 
133. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & James Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and 
the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 23 
(1999) (criticizing enhanced protection for genetic information inter alia 
on public goods grounds). 
134. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A 
Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 485 (2007). 
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This section examines exceptionalism outside of the health do-
main and then analyzes the strength or “stickiness” of health privacy 
exceptionalism under state and federal law. 
A. Limited Exceptional Models Outside of Health Care 
US law does not protect data though any generalized regulatory 
system nor by reference to any general principles. Rather, the system 
is vertical or sector-based. As such, persistent criticisms of HIPAA 
privacy must be put in perspective; HIPAA stands tall when com-
pared to protections given to personal data in other sectors. 
For example, GLBA governs consumer privacy in the financial 
sector.135 The Act declares that financial institutions have “an 
affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of [their] 
customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those 
customers’ nonpublic personal information.”136 Reminiscent of HIPAA, 
GLBA is emphatically sector-specific and applies to narrowly defined 
groups of financial data custodians. Just as HIPAA does not apply to 
all custodians of health care data, so GLBA does not apply to all who 
hold consumer financial data.137 And like HIPAA, GLBA is a down-
stream data protection model that erects a duty of confidentiality138 
and requires notice to consumers of an institution’s privacy policies 
and practices.139 Overall, however, GLBA is far less effective than 
HIPAA: there is administrative confusion because of the large number 
of federal agencies involved; penalties or other remedies are limited; 
and the core non-disclosure rule is subject to seldom triggered 
consumer opt-out.140 
A far narrower provision, the Reagan-era Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1988 (VPPA) applies a downstream data protection model 
to “personally identifiable rental records” of “prerecorded video 
cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.”141 The written consent  
135. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1436 (1999). See generally Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of 
Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (2002). 
136. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012). 
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (2012). Notwithstanding, the FTC does have 
some broad residual powers. See Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646 (May 24, 2000) (codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 313). 
138. 15 U.S.C § 6802(a)(1) (2012) (requiring non-disclosure of “nonpublic 
personal information” to “nonaffiliated third parties”). 
139. See 15 U.S.C §§ 6803(a), (c) (2012). 
140. Kathleen A. Hardee, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Five Years After 
Implementation, Does The Emperor Wear Clothes?, 39 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 915, 921-36 (2006). 
141. Pub. L. No. 100–618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988).  
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to share (opt-in) provision was watered down by the Video Privacy 
Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012 at the behest of streaming 
video providers and social media services that wished to use Internet-
based consent models.142 
Outside of these narrow exceptionally treated domains where leg-
islators were prepared to assert private spaces, privacy protection in 
the U.S. has been moribund. Somewhat alone, the FTC has struggled 
to protect consumer privacy with outdated or clumsy theories such as 
false or misleading representations contained in published privacy 
policies.143 
B. State Privacy Law 
Health privacy and HIPAA frequently are viewed as indistin-
guishable. However, health privacy exceptionalism is not restricted to 
federal law. In the decade and a half since the appearance of the 
HIPAA regulations, state law regarding health privacy appears to 
have receded into the background. After all the Bush Administra-
tion’s health information technology narrative included the 
characterization of divergent state laws as impeding EHR implemen-
tation. 144 Furthermore, in the intervening years several states have 
normalized their laws with HIPAA.145 
There are explicit protections of privacy in a handful of state con-
stitutions.146 And some state supreme courts have implied such a 
 
142. See also Cable TV Privacy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).  
143. See, e.g., Complaint at 6-7, 9, Facebook, Inc., Docket No. C-4365 (Aug. 
10, 2012), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookcmpt.pdf; Press 
Release, FTC, Myspace Settles FTC Charges That It Misled Millions of 
Users About Sharing Personal Information with Advertisers (May 8, 
2012), http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/05/myspace.shtm; Press Release, FTC, 
FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google’s Rollout of its 
Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm.  
144. Activities of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., 
Innovation, and Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
and Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of David J. Brailer, M.D., 
Ph.D., Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs.), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t050630a.html (describing divergent 
state laws as “variations in privacy and security policies that can hinder 
interoperability”). 
145. Ann Waldo, Hawaii and Health Care: A Small State Takes a Giant Step 
Forward, O’REILLY RADAR (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/08/hawaii-health-care-law-simplicity.html 
(discussing House Bill 1957). 
146. See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (amended 1972); ARIZ. CONST., art. II, 
§ 8; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST., art. I, § 12 (amended 1982), § 
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right147 that subsequently has been applied in cases involving medical 
information.148 Yet there is nothing that could be described as excep-
tional. In contrast, a few state legislatures embraced strong, 
exceptional health privacy models in the pre-HIPAA years149 that 
continue to escape preemption due to HIPAA’s “more stringent” 
provision.150 
In fact some states have asserted resilient health privacy 
exceptionalism. There should be little surprise that California has 
built on its enviable consumer protective reputation with additional 
substantive and enforcement provisions. The state’s original Confiden-
tiality of Medical Information Act dates from 1981. It is notable for 
possessing a broader reach than HIPAA, applying, for example, to 
health data custodians who are not health care providers.151 California 
passed one of the first health information breach notification laws.152 
More recently the state established the Office of Health Information 
Integrity to “ensure the enforcement of state law mandating the 
confidentiality of medical information and to impose administrative 
fines for the unauthorized use of medical information.”153 The law 
requires: 
Every provider of health care shall establish and implement ap-
propriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to 
protect the privacy of a patient’s medical information. Every 
provider of health care shall reasonably safeguard confidential 
medical information from any unauthorized access or unlawful 
access, use, or disclosure.154 
Perhaps more surprisingly Texas enacted similarly broad protec-
tion for health information. In sharp contrast to the narrow HIPAA 
conception of a “covered entity,” the Texas law applies to “any 
person who . . . engages . . . in the practice of assembling, collecting, 
 
23 (amended 1998); HAW. CONST., art. I, § 6, 7 (amended 1978); ILL. 
CONST., art. I, § 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 
10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
147. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
148. See, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 497 (Ga. 2000). Cf. State v. 
Davis, 12 A.3d 1271, 1276-77 (N.H. 2010). 
149. E.g., Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-
56.07 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). See also WIS. STAT. §§ 146.81-82 
(2013). 
150. 45 C.F.R § 160.202 (2012). 
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(a) (2012). 
152. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1798.29(g)(4), (5) (2012). 
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130200 (2012). 
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130203(a) (2012). 
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analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or transmitting protected health 
information.”155 Texas also requires “clear and unambiguous permis-
sion” before using health information for marketing156 and broadly 
prohibits the sale of an individual’s protected health information.157 
As discussed above, HITECH (together with a change in admin-
istration) provided the enforcement focus that HIPAA had lacked.158 
However, the 2009 legislation did not alter the longstanding HIPAA 
position of not permitting private rights of action.159 Of course a small 
number of states permit such actions under their health privacy 
statutes.160 However, almost all jurisdictions allow some species of the 
breach of confidence action in such cases,161 and some even allow 
HIPAA in through the “back door,” establishing a standard of care in 
negligence per se cases.162 
For example, Resnick v. AvMed, Inc.163 concerned two unencrypt-
ed laptops that were stolen from the defendant managed care 
company. The compromised data concerned 1.2 million persons, some 
of whom subsequently became victims of identity theft. Dealing with 
Florida law allegations of breach of contract, breach of implied 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, the Eleventh Circuit addressed 
the question whether plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient nexus between 
the data theft and the identity theft. The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had “pled a cognizable injury and . . . sufficient facts to 
allow for a plausible inference that AvMed’s failures in securing their 
data resulted in their identities being stolen. They have shown a 
sufficient nexus between the data breach and the identity theft 
beyond allegations of time and sequence.”164 Overall there seems to be 
a proliferation of data breach cases filed in state courts.165 
 
155. Medical Records Privacy Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
181.001(b)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
156. Id. at § 181.152. 
157. Id. at § 181.153. 
158. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
159. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 
370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 99-100 (D. Colo. 2005). 
160. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.36(b) (2013). 
161. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999). 
162. See, e.g., I.S. v. Wash. Univ., 2011 WL 2433585, at *2-3, 9 (E.D. Mo. 
2011). 
163. 693 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2012). 
164. Id. at 1330. 
165. See, e.g., Scott Graham, Data Breach Cases Vex Health Care Sector, 
THE RECORDER (Sept. 20, 2013), 
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State privacy case law166 and legislation167 are continually evolving 
both in and out of the health care space. However, there is reason to 
believe that health privacy exceptionalism remains an accepted tenet 
among state courts and legislatures.  
C. Exceptionalism at the Federal Level 
While the ethical basis (autonomy) for exceptional protection for 
health privacy is robust,168 a strong legal basis for health privacy 
exceptionalism is harder to articulate. The U.S. Constitution is silent 
on the issue although the decisional privacy cases do recognize limited 
penumbral privacy claims.169 Whalen v. Roe did articulate the duality 
of informational and decisional privacy in a case that, broadly at 
least, concerned health privacy.170 Yet Justice Stevens’ broadest pro-
privacy statement in Whalen failed to articulate any exceptional 
treatment of health information.171 Of course, in Jaffee v. Redmond, 
the same Justice recognized a broad federal common law psychother-
apist privilege rooted in confidence and trust,172 yet it was hardly 
exceptional as it was analogized to the spousal and attorney-client 
privileges.173 More recently, the Supreme Court, while restraining 
 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202620223375&Dat
a_Breach_Cases_Vex_Health_Care_Sector. 
166. See, e.g., Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 747 (Mass. 
2013) (noting Massachusetts law limits collection of personal 
identification data extended to a store collecting zip codes during credit 
card transaction (when not required by issuer)). See also Press Release, 
State of Conn., Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Announces 
$7 Million Multistate Settlement With Google Over Street View 
Collection of WiFi Data (March 12, 2013), 
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=520518. Cf. Siegler v. Best Buy 
Co. of Minn. Inc., 519 F.App’x 604, 604-05 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the retailer was not liable under the federal Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act for collecting information from customers’ driver’s 
licenses when they returned goods).  
167. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5 (2013) (requiring explicit consent 
from the consumer for disclosure of financial information). See also VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 10203-04 (2013). 
168. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 103-05 (6th ed. 2009). 
169. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 52, 60-61 (1976). 
170. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
171. Id. at 605. 
172. 518 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1996). 
173. Id. at 10. 
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some aspects of the surveillance state,174 generally has favored data 
liquidity over data protection.175 
Outside of the health-related HIPAA, the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA),176 and a few other narrow 
sector-specific statutes like GLBA, most federal privacy law is quite 
general in its reach. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974, while 
applicable to health care data collected by the federal government, 
does not seem to apply exceptionally.177 The same can be said of 
federal scrutiny of the privacy standards of private, non-health care 
entities. In this general space the FTC asserts two types of claims 
under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act: “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”178 Thus, with 
regard to privacy, an unfair business practice case might be brought 
against a business for, say, failing to have adequate security, while a 
deceptive or misleading claim might apply to a business that, say, 
failed to comply with its own stated privacy policy. The FTC will 
leave most health care privacy cases to the HHS Office of Civil 
Rights179 although it has asserted its jurisdiction in cases involving 
non-HIPAA entities. For example, In the Matter of CBR Systems, 
Inc., the FTC entered into a settlement with a provider of umbilical 
cord blood and umbilical cord tissue-banking services. The proceeding 
 
174. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
175. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2656-58 (2011) (striking 
down Vermont statute that restricted the sale and use of pharmacy 
records documenting prescribing practices of physicians). 
176. Title I (applicable to health insurers) and Title II (applicable to 
employers and related entities) of GINA prohibit the use of genetic 
information in making insurance and employment decisions, restrict 
those entities from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic 
information, and place limits on the disclosure of genetic information. 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–
233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). 
177. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
178. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). See also § 
45(n). See generally Complaint, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation 2013 WL 1222491 (D. Ariz July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023142/120809wyndhamcmpt.pdf 
(bringing an against a hotel chain for failure to maintain adequate 
security for customer data). 
179. See generally Office for Civil Rights, supra note 22. See also 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the FTC and Food & Drug 
Admin., MOU 225-71-8003 (1971), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/Memorand
aofUnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm115791.htm. 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism 
95 
related to the theft of unencrypted computer drives exposing the 
health information of almost 300,000 of the bank’s customers. 180 
There has been little Congressional consideration of the implica-
tions of health privacy exceptionalism or, for that matter, its absence. 
A rare exception was at the 1999 hearings on GLBA. When it became 
apparent that health insurers would be covered by the proposed 
legislation, a provision was added with the intent to protect health 
data.181 However, that provision would have had the unintended 
consequence of opening up health data to broad opt-out sharing 
among financial institutions with attendant secondary use risks. 
Organizations such as the American Medical Association182 and the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA)183 strongly voiced their 
concerns, and the provision was dropped from the final bill. The 
APA’s Dr. Richard Harding argued before the House of Representa-
tives, “It is critically important to recognize the difference between 
medical records privacy and financial privacy.” He made the case for 
health privacy exceptionalism as follows: 
[T]he damages from breaches of medical records privacy are of a 
different nature. Medical records information can include infor-
mation on heart disease, terminal illness, domestic violence, and 
other women’s health issues, psychiatric treatment, alcoholism 
and drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases and even adultery 
. . . .These disclosures can jeopardize our careers, our friend-
ships, and even our marriages. 
And if such disclosures occur, there are truly few meaningful 
remedies. Seeking redress will simply lead to further dissemina-
tion of the highly private information that the patient wished to 
keep secret . . . .184 
Just a few months later this model of health privacy 
exceptionalism was confirmed when President Clinton introduced the 
first version of the HIPAA privacy rule.185 The rhetoric of  
180. Cbr Sys., Inc., File No. 1123120, 2013 WL 391859, at *13 (FTC Jan. 28, 
2013). 
181. Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 351 (1999) 
(addressing the confidentiality of health and medical information). 
182. Financial Privacy: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Banking 
and Financial Services, 106th Cong. 97-98, 525-34 (1999) (statement of 
Donald J. Palmisano, M.D., J.D., A.M.A.). 
183. Id. at 535-39 (statement of Richard Harding, M.D.). 
184. Id. 
185. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Medical 
Privacy (Oct. 29, 1999), 
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1999pres/19991029b.html. 
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exceptionalism was clear. As the President noted, the purpose of the 
regulation was “to protect the sanctity of medical records,” and it 
represented “an unprecedented step toward putting Americans back in 
control of their own medical records.”186 
Today the federal commitment to health privacy exceptionalism 
seems strong. Of course there were a couple of bumps in the road such 
as when the Bush Administration replaced the original Clinton 
Administration requirement of patient consent to disclosure for 
treatment, payment, or health care operations (TPO) purposes187 with 
the more permissive statement that “[a] covered entity may obtain 
consent of the individual to use or disclose protected health infor-
mation to carry out treatment, payment or health care operations.”188 
On the other hand the Bush Administration seemed to endorse 
health privacy exceptionalism when it championed the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act. GINA, signed into law by 
President Bush in May 2008, broadly prohibits discrimination by 
employers and health insurers based upon genetic information. It does 
so primarily by using an upstream data protection model whereby 
would-be data custodians are prohibited from collecting genetic 
information.189 
Two recent federal government reports that have recommended 
the strengthening of data protection both recognize health privacy 
exceptionalism. Unfortunately, in doing so they may drive the 
unintended consequence of keeping strong, upstream protections out 
of the health care space.  
First, the White House report Consumer Data Privacy in a Net-
worked World,190 while calling for Congress to enact legislation that 
includes an impressive Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights rotating 
around “Fair Information Practice Principles” (FIPPs), limits that 
proposal “to commercial sectors that are not subject to existing 
Federal data privacy laws.”191 Second, the FTC’s Protecting Consum-
er Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,192 which calls for privacy by 
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design and best privacy practices, expresses its sensitivity to burdens 
introduced by “overlapping or duplicative requirements on conduct 
that is already regulated” but more positively suggests the potential 
for the FIPPs framework to provide “an important baseline for 
entities that are not subject to sector-specific laws like HIPAA or 
GLBA.”193 Their considerable promise aside, neither report has led to 
legislation. And with the political classes closing ranks over the Big 
Data-tainted NSA spying controversy, a privacy law reform proposal 
does not seem likely to emerge from either the White House or 
Congress.194 
IV. Reforming Health Privacy Regulation in the Face 
of Big Data 
Clearly big data challenges the core tenets of health privacy and 
its regulation.195 As Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier 
pithily note, “In the era of big data, the three core strategies long 
used to ensure privacy—individual notice and consent, opting out and 
anonymization—have lost much of their effectiveness.”196 Indeed, some 
of the big data implications for privacy are quite dramatic. First, the 
relative agnosticism of big data processing to either data size or data 
format radically reduces the traditional protective role of data 
friction. Second, big data predictive analytics do not content them-
selves with populations but increasingly operate on the individual 
level, thus challenging the core, autonomy-based privacy model. 
Third, big data nullifies core regulatory components such as de-
identification or anonymization.197 Fourth, and –for health privacy 
regulation –the most important effect, is the argument presented in 
this article: that big data increasingly will sidestep sector-based 
downstream health data protection by replicating that data with 
proxy data generated from data pools that are located in lightly 
regulated, HIPAA-free space.  
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While big data is only now attracting the attention of privacy 
advocates, its health-related businesses are in full flow. Clearly the big 
data model is attracting big claims. For example, in 2011 the McKin-
sey Global Institute estimated that “US health care could capture 
more than $300 billion in value every year, with two-thirds of that in 
the form of reductions to national health care expenditure of around 8 
percent.”198  
For all the bold claims and notwithstanding the potential shown 
by the application of some big data technologies to health care, 
barriers remain. A recurring problem with the mapping of technologi-
cal solutions to the U.S. health care model is that major progress 
depends on antecedent change by health care cultures, processes, 
precepts, and stakeholders.199 In a 2013 report McKinsey & Company 
stated the big data challenge as follows: 
The old levers for capturing value—largely cost-reduction 
moves, such as unit price discounts based on contracting and 
negotiating leverage, or elimination of redundant treatments—
do not take full advantage of the insights that big data provides 
and thus need to be supplemented or replaced with other 
measures related to the new value pathways. Similarly, tradi-
tional medical-management techniques will no longer be 
adequate, since they pit payors and providers against each oth-
er, framing benefit plans in terms of what is and isn’t covered, 
rather than what is and is not most effective. Finally, tradition-
al fee-for-service payment structures must be replaced with new 
systems that base reimbursement on insights provided by big 
data—a move that is already well under way.200 
If nothing else, this anterior requirement for health care itself to 
change significantly before the power of big data can be fully lever-
aged may furnish a brief window in which to strengthen health 
privacy. 
While many big data claims are the products of marketing frenzy, 
as yet another group of rent-seekers look to claim a piece of the health 
care economy, some contain a germ of truth. The next question then 
is the classic instrumental one: do the health care gains trump the 
privacy losses? 
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A. Will Big Data Join the Instrumentalist Narrative? 
Because of asserted positive claims made for big data, a fair ques-
tion to ask is whether the benefits to health care should overcome 
(even if only partially) health privacy and its exceptional protections. 
Over the last decade and a half, as the HIPAA model of exceptional 
privacy has asserted itself, many involved in public health or biomedi-
cal research have supported a more utilitarian position. For example, 
Lawrence Gostin and James Hodge have argued that “[i]ndividuals 
should not be permitted to veto the sharing of personal information 
irrespective of the potential benefit to the public” and that “[p]rivacy 
rules should not be so arduous and inflexible that they significantly 
impede . . . health services research or surveillance . . .”201 
However, the traditional rationales for privacy offer little room for 
an instrumentalist balancing of interests. Privacy claims traditionally 
have been based on quite absolutist claims of personhood, autonomy, 
property, control,202 freedom from surveillance, protection from 
discrimination, or “hybrid inalienability.”203 
The physician-patient relationship was the font from which claims 
of privacy were derived. In this model privacy is a consequent or a 
component of autonomy. And, according to Tom Beauchamp and 
James Childress, in the ethical domain “[r]espect for autonomy is not 
a mere ideal in health care; it is a professional obligation. Autonomous 
choice is a right –not a duty –of patients.”204 For them privacy is part 
of the core autonomy “rights” bundle that must be protected as “the 
justification of the right to privacy parallels the justification of the 
right to give an informed consent . . . .”205 
This autonomy model plays out as follows. The autonomous pa-
tient cedes control over (and/or property in) health data to the 
physician. The physician then becomes the patient’s agent and either 
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is bound by the agent’s duty of confidentiality in curating the 
patient’s health data206 or, according to Daniel Solove, may be liable 
for a confidence’s betrayal.207 
Not surprisingly, therefore, reformers wanting to see more health 
data made available for public health or research seek to undermine 
patient autonomy and the physician-patient relationship as founda-
tional of health privacy (and indeed health privacy exceptionalism). 
For example, Roger Magnusson has argued that modern health 
privacy is less about the rights and obligations inherent in the 
physician-patient relationship and is more about “the power of the 
state as the broker for information flows within health care settings.” 
He predicts that: 
Twenty years from now, it is by no means clear that the obvi-
ous starting point when considering health privacy law will be 
either the autonomy interests of health consumers or their treat-
ing physicians. What we now call health privacy laws are likely, 
at that time, to be less patient-focused, and to be described 
(and defended) with reference to the variety of aims that infor-
mation policy, within the health sector, is designed to achieve.208 
Calling out what he believes to be an artifact of a waning bilateral 
relationship, Magnusson predicts that more instrumental forces will 
recalibrate health privacy and, to put words into his mouth, reduce 
health privacy exceptionalism. 
While it seems arguable that the continued industrialization of 
health care will deprecate the physician-patient relationship as a font 
of duties,209 there are other, equally strong (or potentially stronger) 
rationales for privacy. For example, Edward Janger and Paul 
Schwartz argue for “constitutive privacy” whereby “[a]ccess to 
personal information and limits on it help form the nature of the 
society in which we live and shape our individual identities.”210 
Although they seem to admit of considerable balancing at work in 
their model, this is not merely a relabeled utilitarian justification for 
turning over private information. Although Janger and Schwartz were 
primarily discussing the GLBA their constitutive privacy concept 
seems even stronger in the health care sector. They were also impres-
sively prescient about big data, noting more than a decade ago: 
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A financial institution knows whether a customer has recently 
bought running shoes or other consumer products, the name of 
one’s physicians (as well as the nature of their specialty), and 
whether one has purchased orthotics or aspirin or other kinds of 
health care products. Some of this information might be embar-
rassing, and some of it might create potentially damaging labels 
for persons or lead to other harmful results. The cumulative im-
pact of these disclosures can have a profound impact on the 
society in which we live. Regulatory attention is needed to con-
trol the resulting patterns of data accumulation and use.211 
As the big data debate heats up it is likely that public health and 
research interests will join the data-brokers and the purveyors of BI in 
making instrumental arguments for data liquidity. Implied consent or 
opt-out rules will be proposed as the preferable operational rules. It 
will take a considerable effort to maintain the health privacy 
exceptionalism we currently enjoy let alone to promote new upstream 
controls on the data-brokers. 
B. The Unlikely Alternative of Self-Regulation 
In Predictive Analytics Eric Siegel discusses medically inflected 
data in the context of both the well-known story of Target Corpora-
tion’s use of predictive analytics to identify potential customers in 
their second trimester of pregnancy212 and his own research into the 
(apparently benign) practice of a health insurance company that 
predicted customer deaths so as to trigger end-of-life counseling.213 He 
concludes: 
It’s not what an organization comes to know; it’s what it does 
about it. Inferring new, powerful data is not itself a crime, but 
it does evoke the burden of responsibility. Target does know 
how to benefit from pregnancy predictions without actually di-
vulging them to anyone . . . . But any marketing department 
must realize that if it generates quasi-medical data from thin 
air, it must take on, with credibility, the privacy and security 
practices of a facility or department commonly entrusted with 
such data. You made it, you manage it.214 
 
211. Id. at 1253. 
212. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
16, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-
habits.html?pagewanted=all. 
213. SIEGEL, supra note 74, at 64-65. 
214. Id. at 65. 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism 
102 
It also seems to be the FTC position that “with big data comes 
big responsibility. Firms that acquire and maintain large sets of 
consumer data must be responsible stewards of that information.”215 
Unfortunately there is little or no evidence that the big data industry 
has either recognized or accepted any such “made it, manage it” 
mantra. It is at least as likely that these data custodians think of data 
protection as merely creating friction at a time when their businesses 
are thriving on data liquidity. 
In late 2012 Senator John Rockefeller opened an investigation into 
information brokers,216 following in the footsteps of Representatives 
Edward Markey and Joe Barton who had sent letters of inquiry to 
industry members.217 The acting chief executive of the Direct Market-
ing Association subsequently characterized the senator’s investigation 
as “a baseless fishing expedition.” 218 
The indications are that the FTC also is skeptical that any exhor-
tation to self-regulation or best data practices will be sufficient. In 
late 2012 the agency sent subpoenas to a range of data brokers 
seeking to learn “the nature and sources of the consumer information 
the data brokers collect” and “the extent to which the data brokers 
allow consumers to access and correct their information or to opt out 
of having their personal information sold.”219 The FTC increased the 
pressure in March 2013 when it sent warning letters to ten data 
brokers. These alerted the recipients of possible violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act,220 such as selling consumer information for use 
in making insurance or employment decisions without the appropriate 
safeguards.221 
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C. The Case for a New Upstream Data Protection Model 
Distinct from the rationale for data protection are data protec-
tion’s persistent functional and taxonomical problems. Daniel Solove 
has suggested a “harmful activities” taxonomy with four components: 
“(1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) infor-
mation dissemination and (4) invasion.”222 I prefer a broadly 
consistent classification –consistent because it, too, rotates around the 
data acquisition, processing, and disclosure timeline. Hence I make a 
broad distinction between upstream (“privacy”) and downstream 
(“confidentiality”) data protection models. 
The former cluster includes both processes or rules designed to 
reduce the value or threat of data (such as imposing inalienability or 
requiring de-identification) and requirements that place formal 
limitations on data collection such as prohibitions on the collection of 
certain data such as genetic information or contextual rules that, say, 
prohibit the collection or retention of any data other than that 
necessary for the transaction in question. The latter, downstream 
protective cluster includes security requirements specifying physical 
and technological barriers to protect collected data, restrictions on the 
retention, disclosure, or distribution of collected information (for 
example to certain persons or for certain purposes) and notification of 
breach rules when the data has been compromised. 
Obviously HIPAA was and is a downstream confidentiality model. 
Regulatory tweaks and the HITECH statutory modifications may 
have created a better mousetrap but have not deviated from that 
commitment to downstream data protection. Indeed, HITECH went 
further in the direction of downstream protection with its new breach 
notification duty.223 The question is whether a mature confidentiality 
rule abetted by breach notification can cabin big data and thus 
maintain health privacy exceptionalism. 
The core problem is that downstream, disclosure-centric models 
are highly dependent on the context of the original data grant. For 
example, a patient provides data (for example, via a physical exami-
nation) for the purposes of better informing his or her care team. 
Given that context it should be relatively easy to draw the line (or 
understand the scope of the consent) as to the line between appropri-
ate and inappropriate disclosures by the health care providers. Thus, 
given the context we can understand the primary uses of the data and 
cast doubt on most calls on the same data for “secondary” uses. 
In contrast, when there is no disclosure context, as is the case 
when a data-broker creates a medical data proxy of the patient using 
a variety of sources, it is very difficult to draw the non-disclosure line 
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or operationalize meaningful consent. This is also true of indetermi-
nate or intermediated data collection (for example, acquisition of data 
through third parties). As a result, data-brokers either discourage any 
regulation or seek to minimize government interference by nudging 
any regulation in the direction of a highly permissive consumer opt-
out.224 
When disclosure (downstream) regulation becomes compromised 
(as HIPAA has by data proxies) we must explore the potential for 
constraining the supply of big data to the data-brokers with a 
collection (upstream) model. As recently noted by FTC Chairwoman 
Edith Ramirez, 
As important as they are, use restrictions have serious limita-
tions and cannot, by themselves, provide effective privacy 
protection. Information that is not collected in the first place 
can’t be misused. And enforcement of use restrictions provides 
little solace to consumers whose personal information has been 
improperly revealed. There’s no putting the genie back in the 
bottle.225 
The White House’s 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights lists 
seven Fair Information Practices Principles (FIPPs)226 including two 
that primarily are upstream limitations: Individual Control and 
Respect for Context. The former is explained as a consumer “right to 
exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them 
and how they use it.” The latter is explained as a consumer “right to 
expect that companies will collect, use and disclose personal data in 
ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers provide 
the data.”227 In the U.S. the successful fashioning of legal models to 
protect against data collection has been rare –a notable exception 
being the inalienability rule in GINA. However, other jurisdictions 
have been more successful. The original EU data protection directive 
nodded in the direction of health privacy exceptionalism, recognizing 
special protection for a sub-set of data including health.228 The 
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directive also provided for upstream protection in addition to regulat-
ing disclosures. Thus, data collection must be collected for legitimate 
purposes and not retained for unrelated purposes.229 The EU’s new 
draft data protection regulation doubles down on such protections230 
but supplements regulatory protections with a property rights 
remedial model.231 This would be particularly beneficial in a typical 
medically inflected big data scenario. Assume, for example, that a 
data broker collected supermarket or other sales data and developed a 
big data proxy for a person. Assume further that the person had 
consented at, say, a point of sale to the original collection of that 
data. Under the draft regulation the data subject’s privacy rights 
would run with the data and subsequently the subject could demand 
that the data broker destroys the data.232 In addition there are specific 
rights with regard to data that are used for marketing that likely 
would reduce the interest of the business consumers of big data in 
segmentation.233 
Notwithstanding this insight into the realms of the possible (and 
the likely extraterritorial application of the regulation on U.S. 
businesses that touch EU data subjects) the development of upstream 
privacy legislation has slowed. Without federal action (and exactly 
how the FTC proceeds in its investigations of data-brokers will be a 
key barometer) we will likely see some states swatting at big data 
symptoms. While outright state bans on data collection are unlikely 
given the chilling effect of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,234 states may 
require increasingly disclosive privacy policies as exemplified by the 
proposed amendment to the California law235 that would require data  
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collectors to disclose their responses to signals such as those from a 
web browser requesting “do not track.”236 
Achieving either broad (controls on collection) or narrow (for ex-
ample, disclosure of collection practices) limitations on big data 
collection likely will require both regulation and industry adherence to 
best practices consistent with the FTC’s “privacy by design” model.237 
Of course it is probable that if legislation is passed to give life to the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights it will be of general applicability and 
not limited to health data. Indeed, one of the challenges for reformers 
will be to avoid the exclusion of health data based upon its existing 
regulatory models.238 The reality (indeed the necessity) is that 
HIPAA’s downstream model can co-exist with a new upstream 
regulatory model. That is the best model for both guaranteeing health 
privacy’s continued exceptional treatment and limiting the growth of 
big data proxies. 
Conclusion 
There is little doubt about how the big data industry and its cus-
tomers wish any data privacy debate to proceed. In the words of a 
recent McKinsey report, the collective mindset about patient data 
needs to be shifted from “protect” to “share, with protections.” Yet 
any conceded “protections” fall far short of what is necessary and 
what patients have come to expect given our history of health privacy 
exceptionalism. Indeed, some of the specific recommendations are 
antithetical to our current approach to health privacy. For example, 
the report suggests encouraging data sharing and streamlining 
consents, specifically that “data sharing could be made the default, 
rather than the exception.”239 However, McKinsey also noted the 
privacy-based objections that any such proposals would face:  
[A]s data liquidity increases, physicians and manufacturers will 
be subject to increased scrutiny, which could result in lawsuits 
or other adverse consequences. We know that these issues are 
already generating much concern, since many stakeholders have 
told us that their fears about data release outweigh their hope 
of using the information to discover new opportunities.240 
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Speaking at a June 2013 conference FTC Commissioner Julie Brill 
acknowledged that HIPAA was not the only regulated zone that was 
being side-stepped by big data as “new-fangled lending institutions 
that forgo traditional credit reports in favor of their own big-data-
driven analyses culled from social networks and other online 
sources.”241 With specific regard to HIPAA privacy and, likely, data 
proxies, the Commissioner lamented: 
[W]hat damage is done to our individual sense of privacy and 
autonomy in a society in which information about some of the 
most sensitive aspects of our lives is available for analysts to ex-
amine without our knowledge or consent, and for anyone to buy 
if they are willing to pay the going price.242 
Indeed, when faced with the claims for big data, health privacy 
advocates will not be able to rely on status quo arguments and will 
need to sharpen their defense of health privacy exceptionalism, while 
demanding new upstream regulation to constrict the collection of data 
being used to create proxy health data and sidestep HIPAA. As 
persuasively argued by Beauchamp and Childress, “We owe respect in 
the sense of deference to persons’ autonomous wishes not to be 
observed, touched, intruded on and the like. The right to authorize 
access is basic.”243 
Of course one approach to the issue is to shift our attention to 
reducing or removing the incentives for customers of predictive 
analytics firms to care about the data. Recall how Congress was 
sufficiently concerned about how health insurers would use genetic 
information to make individual underwriting decisions that it passed 
GINA, prohibiting them from acquiring such data. Yet, today some 
(but not all) arguments for such genetic privacy exceptionalism seem 
less urgent given that the ACA broadly requires guaranteed issue and 
renewability,244 broadly prohibiting pre-existing condition exclusions 
or related discrimination.245 A realistic long-term goal must be to 
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reduce disparities and discrimination and thereby minimize any 
incentive to segment using data profiling.  
A medium-term but realistic prediction is that there is a political-
ly charged regulatory fight on the horizon. After all, as Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier note, “The history of the twentieth century 
[was] blood-soaked with situations in which data abetted ugly 
ends.”246 Disturbingly, however, privacy advocates may not like how 
that fight likely will turn out. Increasingly, as large swathes of the 
federal government become embroiled in and enamored with big data-
driven decision-making and surveillance, so it may become politically 
or psychologically difficult for them to contemplate regulating 
mirroring behavior by private actors.247 
On the other hand the position that we should not be taken ad-
vantage of without our permission could gain traction resulting in 
calls such as those expressed herein for increased data protection. 
Then we will need to enact new upstream data protection of broad 
applicability (i.e., without the narrow data custodian definitions we 
see in sector-based privacy models). Defeat of such reform will leave 
us huddled around downstream HIPAA protection, an exceptional 
protection but increasingly one that is (in big data terms) too small 
to care about and that can be circumvented by proxy data produced 
by the latest technologies. 
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